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Q&A with FWD.us Immigration Felow David Leblang

FWD.us has been advocating for new legal pathways, including humanitarian parole, refugee resettlement, the addition of temporary work visas, and improving family-based migration, as the most effective policies to address the unprecedented levels of forced migration in the Western Hemisphere.

David Leblang, FWD.us Immigration Fellow and Ambassador Taylor Professor of Politics and Compton Professor of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, has spent more than two decades researching the journeys of international migrants around the world. His quantitative research reveals that more aggressive border enforcement tactics and offshoring immigration control to other countries do not ultimately deter migrants, but only delay their arrival or detour their journeys. Instead, Professor Leblang’s research suggests that the more effective response to widespread migration in the region is to create more legal pathways, both for those escaping violence and for those who would like to contribute economically to the United States.

Q: Professor Leblang, please tell us about some of the global research you’ve done on international migration, particularly among the Americas.

A: I have spent quite a bit of time examining the factors that lead people to leave their homes and the policies that destination countries use to attract or deter prospective migrants. Leaving one’s home is risky; there is uncertainty about job prospects, educational opportunities, cultural acceptance, and the wide variety of community support that might be available across potential destinations. We find that most people do not want to leave home; migration is often a last option, especially for families facing the likelihood of violence or starvation. This is especially apparent in the Western Hemisphere, where domestic violence and climate change, including droughts, have driven more migration from, for example, Honduras and Guatemala to the U.S. southern border.

“The reality is that migrants who have already arrived are not going to return home even when faced with increased border enforcement; rather, they will wait until the expected benefit from attempting border crossing exceeds the benefit from delaying.”

Q: Based on your research, please describe how increasing border enforcement would impact migration at the U.S. southern border.

A: The premise of border enforcement is not just that it will keep people from entering, but that it will also deter people from even trying. Sealing a border is impossible; in the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, it is wholly implausible, not just due to topography but also because trade, investment, and tourism necessitate opportunities for people to move between the two countries. As for using increased enforcement as a deterrent, this works only if individuals anticipate that the costs of attempting to enter the United States exceed the costs of remaining at home. Families arriving on the U.S. southern border have decided that remaining at home is just not viable. It is telling that even the risk of death in the journey from Mexico to the United States does not deter potential migrations.

So what does border enforcement do? In some recent research focusing on border enforcement prior to COVID (the use of Title 42 changed some of these dynamics), I find that significantly ramping up enforcement efforts at the border does not deter migration; it only delays it.

For example, my analysis finds that border security efforts do deflect potential migrants into other border patrol sectors, as previous research has shown, but they do not deter migrants from making the initial journey or further attempts to enter. Importantly, I find that border enforcement delays migrant entry. Utilizing high-frequency data on migrant encounters on the U.S. southern border, I find that an increase in border enforcement efforts does decrease apprehensions, but only in the short term. The reality is that migrants who have already arrived on the Mexican side of the border are not going to return home even when faced with increased border enforcement; rather, they will wait until the expected benefit from attempting border crossing exceeds the benefit from delaying.

Sources: ICE, U.S. Border Patrol.

We can see this process using the Yuma and San Diego Customs and Border Patrol sectors as examples. In both sectors we observed a steady increase in border enforcement activities through the years of the Trump administration, as expressed by ICE detentions in these sectors. At this time, the majority of those apprehended were from countries other than Mexico, mostly from countries in the Northern Triangle that had experienced increased violence and unusually dry growing seasons during the last half of 2017 through 2018. With this buildup in 2019, added border detentions were simply insufficient to lead migrants to return home; they just waited and crossed later.

While apprehensions remained at relatively stable levels during 2017 and 2018, there was a large spike in apprehensions in the beginning of 2019 , despite a continued level of enforcement. In fact, the trends show that increased detention may slow apprehensions for a time, only for numbers to rebound a few months later, indicating that migrants wait and only delay their eventual migration. Many explanations can be posited for rises and falls in apprehensions, but in my analysis the month-to-month correlation, when accounting for many possible factors and looking at the long-term patterns, shows there is a definite relationship between added enforcement followed by higher apprehensions a few months following.

“I examine the effectiveness of these policies and find that, like efforts to deter migrants from entering specific sectors, they do not reduce the number of people attempting to enter the U.S.”

Q: Based on your analysis of international migration patterns around the world, how do changes in border policies in the U.S. or in neighboring countries impact the arrival of migrants to the U.S. border?

Across the Atlantic, European countries and the European community more generally have used a strategy of “offshoring” as a mechanism to decrease migrant arrivals. In general, this strategy uses economic incentives to persuade transit countries to increase enforcement at their borders. For example, the EU recently offered Tunisia over one billion euros to patrol the Mediterranean Sea. These efforts informed the Trump administration’s attempts to pressure Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to deter or detain migrants in transit. The Biden administration has followed suit, working with countries in South and Central America in the hopes they will decrease the number of migrants transiting through their countries even before they arrive in Mexico.

In a recent paper, I examine the effectiveness of these policies and find that, like efforts to deter migrants from entering specific sectors, they do not reduce the number of people attempting to enter the U.S. Again, the logic is that it takes a lot for people to decide to leave their homes; altering border policies along the route will only lead people to find alternative routes.

Sources: Panama Migration Services and Control; U.S. Customs Border and Protection.

For instance, take the apprehensions of Venezuelans at the U.S. southern border from the beginning of the Biden administration, January 2021, through the middle of 2023. What is notable is that after a huge spike in Venezuelan encounters in December 2021, there is an immediate decrease. In January 2022, Mexico changed its entry policy for Venezuelans; what had been visa-free entry into Mexico now required a visa. This policy did immediately decrease the apprehensions of Venezuelans. What happened, however, is that rather than entering Mexico through the air or by sea, routes that could enforce visa requirements, Venezuelans began to move northward by land, through the Darién Jungle, and crossing irregularly into Mexico. Ultimately, these migrants were apprehended at the U.S. border. This is an example of how third-country visa policies will only detour migration to different routes, another form of delaying their eventual arrival at the U.S. border.

“Parole processes had an immediate impact by channeling migrants into legal channels, leading to fewer encounters at the U.S. southern border.”

Q: What recommendations would you give to members of Congress who are looking for policy solutions in managing the border at a time when migration within the Western Hemisphere is at an all-time high, and it seems that migration to the U.S. is inevitable?

A: My research leads to a fairly consistent conclusion: It is difficult, if not impossible, to deter immigration when the volume of migration is exceptionally high in a given region, like we are currently experiencing in the Western Hemisphere. Border enforcement does not work, nor does deterrence through deportation. The question is what can help manage an increasingly disorderly immigration process at the U.S. southern border. Certainly, better management of the processes associated with the U.S. asylum system could help. Parole processes—specifically those affecting Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua—had an immediate impact by channeling migrants into legal channels, and, in most cases, leading to fewer encounters of individuals from these countries at the U.S. southern border.

Sources: Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

But there is another solution to managing border encounters, one that may not be immediately apparent. In related work, Ben Helms and I have found that an increase in remittances to households decreases subsequent forced migration. Remittances help households economically, providing them with resources that enable them to remain at home. By expanding Temporary Protected Status (TPS)—protecting immigrants from deportation and giving them access to work authorizations—to several countries for immigrants already in the U.S. who cannot safely return home, these immigrants with greater access to the U.S. labor market can increase their remittances.

The opinions expressed are of David Leblang and do not necessarily represent the views of University Virginia.

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